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Abstract: One of the most important contributions in Roland Posner’s work 
(1993) was the extension and development of the Gricean paradigm on meaning 
(1957) in a systematic framework, providing thus a general foundation of semiotic 
phenomena. According to this approach, communication consists in behaviors or 
artifacts based on reciprocal assumptions about the intentions and beliefs of the 
subjects involved in a semiotic exchange. Posner’s model develops with clarity the 
hierarchical relationships of semiotic phenomena of different complexity, from 
simple pre-communicative behaviors (like indicating or signaling) to full commu-
nicative acts. Not only limited to linguistic communication, this framework can be 
successfully extended in the description of all kind of sign production, from ges-
tures to artifacts. 
This article discusses a key point of this paradigm, namely our faculty to at-
tribute mental states to other individuals through the observation of their behavior, 
artifacts or texts. New insights from neuropsychology and developmental psy-
chology are discussed in supporting the validity of this model of communication. 
 
 
1. Two main criticisms against the beliefs and intentions-models  
of communication 
 
The topic of mental state attribution, and its application to the study of 
communication, is plagued by two fundamental theoretical problems:1 
1. The first is the propensity to presuppose mental states in circum-
stances where they are in fact absent. For example, we can attribute men-
tal states to a story’s character or to institutions. The problem is thus to 
determine when the attribution of mental states is realistic and when it is 
just a case of metaphorical or ‘naïve’ thinking. 
2. Furthermore, the attribution processes in the communication 
models based on the recognition of beliefs and intentions usually reach 
high levels of complexity. Believing that „the speaker intends me to be-
lieve that she wants that I believe x” (or similar ‘higher order’ beliefs) 
sounds too complex to be realistic for some. Some authors (see Meggle 
                                                           
1  The topics presented here have been initially developed in depth in Arielli 2006. 
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1983) even suggest that communication presupposes infinite levels of 
nested beliefs, which appears to be psychologically impossible. 
To address the two problems concerning the realism and the complex-
ity of attribution processes let consider following Aesopian fable (adapted 
from Ryan 1991, Betram 1979): 
The Fox and the Rooster  
Once a Dog and a Rooster went into the woods. Soon it grew dark. 
The Rooster said, ‘Let us stay here all night. I will stay in this tree-
top. You can sleep in the hollow trunk.’ So the Dog and the 
Rooster went to sleep. In the morning the Rooster began to crow. 
A Fox heard him crow. He said, ‘That is a rooster crowing. He 
must be lost in the woods. I will eat him for my breakfast.’ Soon 
the Fox saw the Rooster in the tree-top. He said to himself: ‘I must 
make him come down from the tree.’ So he said to the Rooster, 
‘What a fine rooster you are! How well you sing! Will you come to 
my house for breakfast?’ The Rooster said, ‘Yes, thank you, I will 
come if my friend may come, too.’ ‘Oh yes’, said the Fox, ‘I will 
ask your friend. Where is he?’ The Rooster said, ‘My friend is in 
the hollow tree. He is asleep. You must wake him.’ The Fox said to 
himself: ‘Ha ha! I shall have two roosters for my breakfast!’ So he 
puts his head into the hollow tree. Then he said, ‘Will you come to 
my house for breakfast?’. Out jumped the Dog, and caught the 
Fox by the nose. 
The story is straightforward and easy to understand, there is no intricate 
plot and it does not require any complex cultural reference or reasoning 
to see what has happened. We grasp the narrative of the story by building 
a representation or a model of the world in which the events take place. 
We build this model not only using a description of physical events, but 
more importantly we are able to describe the mental states of the story’s 
characters, attributing beliefs and intentions to them. 
Without these attributions we would not be able to understand the 
essence of the story. Let us consider, for example, the moment in which 
the Rooster hears the Fox’s invitation to come to his house, but is aware 
of its true intentions. In this phase of the tale, the Rooster knows or be-
lieves that 1) the Fox intends to eat him and that 2) the Fox intends to 
make the Rooster believe that he is friendly and wants to invite him for 
breakfast (this is a complex knowledge: the Rooster knows that the Fox 
wants that the Rooster believes that the Fox wants to invite him for break-
fast) and that 3) the Fox intends that the Rooster decides to come down 
from the top of the tree. Finally, of course, the Rooster knows that there 
is a dog in the trunk, while at the same times he knows that the Fox does 
not have this information. Subsequently, the plan worked up by the 
Rooster can be described as the intention to make the Fox believe that he 
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is accepting his invitation and that there is a ‘companion’ down in the tree 
that still needs to be invited. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Reader’s knowledge of the story’s events 
  
The Rooster’s mind: 
 The Rooster knows or be-
lieves that his friend the dog 
is in the trunk and that 
  
  
the Fox intends to eat 
him and intends that 
the Rooster believes 
that the Fox likes his 
crowing and that 
  
  
the Fox intends to 
invite him for 
breakfast.
The Rooster intends to 
chase the Fox away and in-
tends that 
the Fox believes that in 
the trunk there is an-
other rooster and be-
lieves 
  
that the Rooster be-
lieves the Fox to be 
friendly 
the Fox intends to 
wake the companion in 
the trunk (meeting 
eventually the dog). 
the Rooster intends to 
come down
The Fox’s mind: 
 
The Fox believes that there is 
a Rooster lost in the wood 
and that the Rooster is alone. 
 
The Fox intends that 
 
the Rooster believes 
that the Fox likes his 
crowing and believes 
that 
 
the Fox intends to 
invite him for 
breakfast. 
the Rooster intends to 
come down from the 
tree top. 
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It is possible to describe in the same manner all beliefs and intentions 
from the Fox’s standpoint. What we get is a structure in which beliefs 
about beliefs, intentions or beliefs about intentions - and so on - combine 
to form a complex system of mental states embedded in one another that 
we, the readers, attribute to the two characters in the fable. Figure 1 
shows the breakdown of the characters’ mental states when the Fox in-
vites the Rooster to go down and the Rooster is already preparing his 
countermove (in this diagram, beliefs are represented as single bordered 
boxes, intentions as double bordered boxes). 
In this analysis we form quite inelegant sentences (“believing that the 
other believes that ...”, “intending that the other believes ...”, and so on), 
revealing how surprisingly complex the representation of the characters’ 
mental states is in a particular moment of this simple story. Still, the un-
derstanding of this complex hierarchical nesting of beliefs and intentions 
is a necessary condition in following the narrative. It may seem implausible 
to keep in mind these complex relationships, yet without these assump-
tions it would be impossible for the reader to get the story. Without 
grasping all the structure, we wouldn’t be able to answer the simplest 
questions about what has happened, who outsmarted whom, and so on. 
 
The fact that we attribute mental states to fictional (and non-human) 
characters in a fantasy tale gives us, in part, an answer to the first question 
posed at the beginning: the ability to represent and reason about mental 
states is independent from the question if we recognize those states as real 
or not. We know that we are dealing with a fictional story, still we don’t 
have any problem pretending as if we were in front of ‘real minds’.  
Moreover, understanding a story as simple as this presupposes the 
grasping of complex nested mental states, and this gives us an answer to 
the second question: we are able to easily maintain complex representa-
tions of this kind. As in many types of cognitive processes, we are not 
aware of the complexity of these mechanisms, despite the spontaneity 
with which we master them. The cognitive mechanisms that are active 
during the reading of a text include the decoding of its linguistic signs, the 
construction of a model of the story and the mental states of its charac-
ters. Our mind is able to carry out those functions automatically, without 
our conscious awareness, sometimes even eluding our introspection. This 
is true in general processes such as perception, motor coordination, rea-
soning, but also in the production and comprehension of speech and 
texts. 
It is to be noted that, according to the models of communication 
based on beliefs and intentions, the diagram in Figure 1 is quite complex, 
but not complex enough, since it does not describe the mental processes 
that are presupposed in every simple communicative act of the story’s 
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characters. ‘Make someone believing something’ by means of a sentence 
(‘Will you come to my house for breakfast?’) should be further broken 
down in the well known triple-parted bundle of intentions and beliefs that 
are described by Grice’s and Posner’s model of communication as neces-
sary conditions for a speech act. 
 
 
2. The epistemological status of reasoning about mental states 
 
Reasoning about mental states and attributing them to ‘minds’ (fictional 
or real), constitute the ground on which Grice’s and Posner’s models of 
communication are based. The epistemological and psychological status 
of mental states is however the object of traditional debate and has often 
been questioned. In the philosophical debate on the scientific validity of 
behavioral explanations in terms of mental states, the so-called eliminativ-
ist position considers intentional concepts (belief, knowledge, will, under-
standing, and so on) hopelessly incompatible with a scientific and natural-
istic description. According to this position, we need to replace them with 
behavioral descriptions or, as suggested more recently, reduce them to the 
description of neuronal processes. According to this position, mental 
states are similar to pseudo-scientific notions like the medieval phlogiston 
or simply to everyday figure of speech like ‘The sun rises’, a sentence that 
has a meaning in the common language even if we know that this is scien-
tifically unsound, since the sun does not evolve around the earth. 
Still, notions such as belief, intention and other mental states are not 
only metaphorical labels, since they are an essential part of the way we 
understand the behavior of people and talk about it. A description in 
terms of physical and neuronal processes, although scientifically appropri-
ate, would neither be realistic nor useful in everyday usage. That is, folk 
psychological explanations are not scientific, but this does not mean that 
they are wrong models of human behavior. Describing behaviors in men-
talist terms has in fact strong explanatory and predictive validity. Al-
though the psychology of common sense is not supported by the scrutiny 
of the scientific method, its validity is continually tested in everyday life, 
proving to be a good set of heuristics for the understanding of human ac-
tion. If using mental states were entirely inadequate to explain and predict 
consistently a good part of our behavior, they would have never devel-
oped as an essential part of our language. With reference to this topic, 
Daniel Dennett (1987) proposed to consider the use of mental concepts 
as an attitude or stance specific to certain types of complex behaviors, for 
reasons of simplicity and efficacy. This happens also with respect to enti-
ties that do not have a real mind. For example I can use intentional con-
cepts when I say that my bank’s central computer ‘knows’ the status of 
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my account or the chess program I’m playing against ‘intends’ to block 
the progression of my pawn. 
 
 
3. The neural basis of intention attribution 
 
Recent research in areas such as developmental psychology, autism re-
search and so-called social-neuropsychology have shown that reasoning and 
attributing mental states not only means using conventional labels, nor is 
a simple chosen stance to take for convenience. There are several indica-
tions that our brains are biologically wired to recognize and elaborate 
others’ mental states and intentions. According to these findings, there is 
a neuronal basis of mentalizing (Frith and Frith 2006) or mind reading, 
that is of our ability to formulate hypotheses about others’ mind beliefs 
and intentions, building representations of their mental states. This is a 
feature that evolution developed in humans and probably in apes. 
With reference to the understanding of stories, a study by Fletcher et 
al. (1995) has shown that certain brain regions are activated during the 
reading of events requiring the attribution of mental states (like Aesop’s 
fable at the beginning), but they are not active if we are reading about 
events that are purely physical. 
A widespread view about the faculty of understanding others’ mental 
states is offered by the so-called simulation theory (see Goldman 1993; 
Gallese and Goldman 1998), a philosophical explanation that has been 
supported by recent neurological findings. According to it, we are able to 
attribute mental states to others because we ‘put ourselves in their shoes’, 
we represent their motives, beliefs and intentions as if we were in their 
situation. Simulating others’ cognitive states using our own cognitive re-
sources allow us to understand and predict the behavior of other people. 
A possible neural source of this simulation skill has been given by the dis-
covery of so-called mirror neurons (Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998, Rizzolatti 
et al. 2001), first in the brains of monkeys and then of humans. These are 
a specialized set of neurons that are activated only when a subject carries 
an action (e.g. grasping an object) but also when the subject observes 
someone else performing the same action. This would suggest the pres-
ence of a common mechanism for both the production and the perception 
of an action. According to many researchers, mirror neurons form the ba-
sis of our ability to simulate and understand the mental states of other 
subjects. The ability to attribute mental states would have allowed the 
evolution of complex social interactions, favoring the effective coordina-
tion between group members and giving rise to communication: it has 
been in fact suggested (Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998) that mirror neurons 
can offer a neurobiological explanation for the evolution of language, and 
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the fact they are concentrated in Broca’s area - one of the centers of pro-
duction and comprehension of language - seems to confirm this fact. This 
hypothesis would be a fascinating and controversial biological evidence of 
the close relationship between the understanding of mental states and 
communication. 
Research on brain mechanisms about mind reading is an area in full 
development. In particular the findings on the neural basis of our ability 
to coordinate and interact with others are building a new disciplinary area, 
called social neuroscience (Singer 2006, Ciaramitano et al. 2007) that offers 
new scientific support to the classic models of communication based on 
intentions and beliefs recognition. 
 
 
4. Theories of mind 
 
Parallel to the neuropsychological research, another view supporting the 
centrality and reality of mental states attribution suggests that during our 
development we build theories of mind in order to explain the behavior of 
other subjects (Gopnik 1996, Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997). All children 
develop different models of the mind’s working during their growth, with 
which they try to explain and predict the behavior of other people. The 
assumptions and the rules we formulate about others’ minds are progres-
sively tested with our experience, and then refined, revised or rejected 
during our development, in a similar fashion as a scientist testing hy-
pothesis and developing theories. 
Developmental psychologists since Jean Piaget have tried to deter-
mine when and how the ability to ‘read’ others’ minds emerges. Recently 
it has been argued that the ability to understand others’ mental states is 
based on a modular brain function, similar to those that govern perception 
and language (Leslie 1994, Baron-Cohen 1995). Leslie (1992) suggests 
that a module (called Theory of Mind Mechanism) allow us to naturally 
develop ‘naïve’ psychological explanation of others’ behavior and to at-
tribute mental states. 
Determining how and when the ability of a child to understand the 
mind of others appears is a difficult task. First experimental studies have 
shown that around the age of four there is a remarkable change in the 
ability to attribute beliefs to others. In a classic experiment on false beliefs 
(Wimmer and Perner 1983), the researcher presented to a child a fictional 
character (Maxi) hiding a toy in a box and then leaving the room. After 
Maxi had left, the object was then moved by the experimenter to a differ-
ent place before the child’s eyes. Afterward Maxi went back into the room 
and the experimenter asked the child to predict where Maxi would proba-
bly look for the toy. Adults and children above age four attributed to 
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Maxi a false belief, and expected that he would search for the toy in the 
box where it was initially hidden. Children under the age of four years 
usually answered that Maxi would look in the new hiding place, according 
to what they knew. 
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that these studies show 
that under the age of four we don’t have an understanding of others’ men-
tal states. The inability to attribute a (false) belief does not exclude the 
ability to attribute mental states otherwise. In fact, it has been shown that 
the understanding of desire and emotional states of others is reached well 
before the age of three, and also that children, even before they are able to 
pass the false belief test, are good at forecasting other people’s behavior 
and preferences (Repacholi and Gopnik 1997; Meltzoff 1995; Bellagamba 
and Tomasello, 1999). 
There is some agreement that a nine months old child first reaches a 
level of behavior’s complexity in which we would say that she is able to 
act intentionally and to take account of the intentionality of others. Ac-
cording to Tomasello (2003), this faculty is linked to the ability to recog-
nize causal relationships in the world. Every child rapidly learns to build a 
sort of ‘map’ of the causal regularities of the environment (cf. Gopnik et 
al. 2004), whose complexity grows from the simple physical causality of 
directly observable events to hidden causal mechanisms concerning the 
behavior of others: mental states are in this sense invisible causes that 
move people. 
 
 
5. The case of autism 
 
Important clues about the development of the ability to attribute mental 
states come from autism studies. A peculiar characteristic of autistic pa-
tients seems to be their inability to understand and reason about the men-
tal states of other people, making it impossible to develop a proper com-
municative competence, independently of the development of other 
cognitive abilities. Autistic children, for example, are unable to pass the 
false belief test, even at an age at which other children are able to make 
correct predictions. Moreover, they are not able to understand simple nar-
ratives, such as the one presented at the beginning, that require an under-
standing of mental states, whereas they do not have problems with the de-
scription of purely mechanical events (Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith 
1986). 
The clinical research of Leslie (1992, 1994), Baron-Cohen et al. 
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith 1985, Baron-Cohen, 1995) have led to the 
hypothesis that one cause of autism is a defect in those areas of the brain 
responsible for ‘mind reading’, like Leslies’s Theory of Mind module . 
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This defect explains the difficulty of the autistic subjects to develop a 
proper communicative competence, even though they do not have defi-
ciencies in the mastery of the syntactic and semantic rules of a language. 
What is lacking, is the ability to use a language as a tool to influence and 
understand the mental states of other people (Leslie 1994). Depending on 
the severity of the condition, autistic individuals often lack the under-
standing of indirect communication, like irony, or figurative speech, that 
require inferences about what a speaker really means beyond what he lit-
erally said.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Communication requires the ability to reason about the mind of other 
people. The models of communication that take origin from Grice’s sug-
gestions and were developed in its full formal clarity by Posner (1993) are 
based on the assumption that we are able to keep track of very complex 
relationships between mental states such as intentions and beliefs. This 
approach has been put into criticism from two sides, concerning firstly 
the epistemological reality of mental concepts, and secondly showing how 
these models seem to be psychologically unrealistic, since they presup-
pose complex cognitive processes that seem at odds with the ease of hu-
man semiotic behavior. 
In this short essay I tried to argue that the ‘stance’ we tend to take in 
attributing mental states even to fictional or non-human entities is reveal-
ing of a faculty of our minds in building complex representations of 
nested relationships of beliefs and intentions, as the opening example of 
Aesop’s tale showed. The fact that even a simple story requires a complex 
structure of mental concepts indicates that most part of our reasoning 
about mental processes is implicit and automatic. 
Moreover, recent research on the neurological basis of mind reading 
and on the development of the ability to make assumption about others’ 
mental states has given growing support to the hypothesis of a biological 
and evolutionary origin of this faculty, offering an empirical and not only 
theoretical evidence of Posner’s contribution to the foundation of a gen-
eral theory of semiotics. 
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